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BankCaR is a credit risk model that forecasts the distribution of a commercial 
bank's charge-offs. The distribution depends only on systematic factors; 
BankCaR takes each bank and projects its expected charge-off across a 
distribution of good years and bad years. Since most bank failures occur in bad 
years, this analysis has promise for both banks and bank supervisors. 
 
In BankCaR, charge-offs depend on the bank's loan balances and the charge-off 
rates of twelve categories of lending. A joint distribution of the twelve charge-off 
rates is calibrated to a long history of regulatory reporting data. Applied to the US 
banking system, BankCaR finds that credit risk is rising and is concentrated most 
significantly in construction lending. Applied to individual banks, BankCaR 
efficiently identifies those that have an adverse combination of credit risk and 
capital.  
 
BankCaR uses publicly available regulatory reporting data, the most common 
credit portfolio model, and standard quantitative techniques. These generic 
qualities can provide a standard of comparison between banks. They also can 
provide an individual commercial bank with a benchmark for more elaborate 
vended credit models. 
 
 
Keywords:  credit risk, risk screening, loan charge-offs, validation 
 
JEL classification: G32, G21, G38  
  - 2 -Introduction and summary 
 
BankCaR (Bank Capital-at-Risk) is a credit risk model that forecasts the 
distribution of charge-offs at commercial banks in the United States. Its goal is to 
improve the identification, quantification, and management of inherent bank 
credit risk. BankCaR can supplement a bank's internal credit risk model or 
benchmark credit risk in the absence of other models. 
  
BankCaR forecasts risks rather than outcomes. Traditionally, the analysis of bank 
risk involves a forecast of what is likely to happen to a bank, a sector, or the 
macro economy. Instead, BankCaR forecasts what can happen under a broad 
range of circumstances. BankCaR's focus on risk represents a departure from 
traditional analyses of bank losses. 
 
Applied to the US banking system, BankCaR finds that credit risk is rising, and 
that it is concentrated most significantly in construction lending. Applied to 
individual banks, BankCaR identifies those that have an adverse combination of 
credit risk and capital.  
 
The paper begins with a brief discussion of the data employed. The data are 
gathered from regulatory filings that are available on the public record since 
1984. These filings do not contain all the information that is available to bank 
managers and bank examiners. Where detailed information is not available, 
BankCaR assumes uniformity between banks and over time. 
 
An overview describes the model in general terms. BankCaR extends the model 
employed in Basel II to include twelve risk factors corresponding to twelve 
categories of lending. The probability distribution of a bank's annual charge-off 
depends on the bank's twelve loan balances and on the statistical distribution of 
the twelve charge-off rates. The assumptions are discussed in detail. Most of the 
assumptions arise from the nature of the data in the regulatory filings. Following 
the overview, the mathematics of the model and its calibration are presented. 
 
Two sections report results at year-end 2006. First, BankCaR is applied to the 
aggregated US banking system. The greatest potential for loss stems from three 
categories: consumer, commercial and industrial (C&I), and construction. 
Construction becomes increasingly likely to dominate at greater levels of overall 
loss. This result departs from historical data, in which construction charge-offs 
have never played the dominant role. Thus, BankCaR predicts that a year with 
unusually high charge-offs will have an unusual primary source, namely, charge-
offs on construction loans.  
 
Next, BankCaR is applied separately to each US commercial bank. The majority 
of banks, if exposed to stressful conditions, charge off more construction loans 
than any other category. Scenarios those that cause banks to become 
undercapitalized tend to produce high levels of construction charge-offs. 
  - 3 -BankCaR efficiently identifies banks that have an adverse combination of credit 
risk and capital.  
 
 
Bank loans and charge-offs 
 
BankCaR begins its analysis with the outstanding loan balances in twelve 
categories. The categories appear in Table 1. 
 
Category Call Report data elements
C&I Commercial and industrial loans
Consumer Credit cards
Other revolving credit plans
Other consumer loans (includes single payment, installment, and all student loans)
Other Other loans
Loans to foreign governments and official institutions (including foreign central banks)
Obligations (other than securities and leases of states and political subdivisions in the US)
Depository Institutions Loans to depository institutions and acceptances of other banks
To commercial banks in the US
To other depository institutions in the US
To banks in foreign countries
Lease Financing Lease financing receivables (net of unearned income)
Agriculture Loans to finance agricultural production and other loans to farmers
Construction Construction, land development, and other land loans
Non-farm non-residential Secured by nonfarm nonresidential properties
Multifamily Secured by multifamily (5 or more) residential properties
Farm Secured by farmland (including farm residential and other improvements)
1-4 Revolving Revolving, open-end loans secured by 1–4 family residential properties and extended under lines of credit
1-4 Other Closed-end loans secured by 1–4 family residential properties
Tier 1 Tier 1 Capital
ALLL Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses
Total Assets Total Assets
Table 1. Loan categories and Call Report data elements
Loans are taken from Schedule RC-C Loans and Lease Financing Receivables, charge-offs from RI-B Charge-offs and Recoveries on 
Loans and Leases and Changes in Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses, Tier 1 capital from RC-R Regulatory Capital and total assets 
and ALLL from RC Balance Sheet. See http://www.chicagofed.org/economic_research_and_data/commercial_bank_data.cfm.  
 
The data source is the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income, generally 
referred to as the call reports. Call reports are an authoritative source of both the 
current loan balances for a bank and the historical charge-off rates for the 
banking system. Banks are required by law to make timely and accurate call 
report filings, and bank examiners verify that the filings reflect a bank's accounts. 
Call report data are available to the public and useful beginning 1984—a period 
significantly longer than most other credit loss data sets.  
 
As shown in Table 1, some categories are combinations of several call report data 
elements. Over time data elements have evolved, usually to provide greater detail. 
This is most notably the case for the six real estate categories that became 
separately available only beginning in 1991.1  
 
BankCaR uses the category data in two distinct ways: a bank's outstanding dollar 
balances are the amounts subject to charge-off, and historical US aggregate 
annual gross charge-off rates are used to calibrate the probability model. The 
                                                 
1 Real estate consists of four commercial real estate categories (construction, farm, multifamily, 
and nonfarm nonresidential) and two residential categories (one-to-four-family revolving 
residential and one-to-four-family other residential). 
  - 4 -combination of a bank's current loans and the distribution of charge-off rates 
















































Figure 1 presents the recent history of outstanding loan balances for all US 
commercial banks. Loans grow 6.9% per year on average over the sample period. 
Also shown is the decomposition of loans into the twelve categories. Over the 
sample period, the proportion devoted to C&I declines by about half while 




















































Figure 2 shows annual aggregate gross charge-off rates for US commercial banks 
in five selected categories. Several characteristics stand out. Different categories 
have different means, ranging from 0.15% (one-to-four-family other residential) 
to 2.68% (consumer). Dispersion around these means also differ from category to 
category. Further, the timing of cycles of different categories is not well 
synchronized, for example, the 2001 recession has little or no effect on real estate 
charge-offs; consumer lending has cycles of charge-off rates apparently unrelated 
to other categories.  
 
 
  - 5 -Overview of BankCaR 
 
This section begins with an intuitive motivation for the statistical model 
underlying BankCaR. It then describes BankCaR's distinguishing features, which 
are correlated factors and charge-off rate scenarios. The section concludes with 
definitions of the risk measures produced by BankCaR. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 suggest the features that a statistical model of bank charge-off 
rates should possess. The model should analyze at least to the category level, 
because the categories have different average charge-off rates and the relative 
weights of the categories can change. Categories should be allowed to differ not 
only in mean but also in dispersion around the mean. Finally, categories should 
be allowed to vary together, but with less than perfect synchrony. A single factor 
model (such as employed in Basel II) cannot capture the sometimes contrary 
behaviors of charge-off rates in different categories.  
 
The model underlying BankCaR is designed to match these broad features. To 
allow for lack of synchrony, BankCaR employs twelve separate, imperfectly 
correlated risk factors. Each factor controls a category charge-off rate. To allow 
different categories to have different means and different dispersions, each 
charge-off distribution is governed by two parameters.  
 
A random draw of twelve possible charge-off rates is referred to as a charge-off 
scenario. Applied to a bank, a scenario produces an amount charged off. 
BankCaR employs 100,000 scenarios in total. The set of 100,000 possible 
charge-off amounts constitute the estimate of the bank's charge-off distribution.  
 
 
Figure 3. From correlated normal factors to BankCaR scenarios
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Figure 3 illustrates the production of 1,000 scenarios for two categories, C&I and 
construction. BankCaR uses the same procedure to produce 100,000 scenarios 
involving all twelve category charge-off rates.  
 
The panel at the left shows 1,000 random draws from a pair of correlated 
standard normal factors. They exhibit the degree of correlation calibrated 
  - 6 -between C&I and construction, which is 59%. For illustrative purposes, a point is 
chosen and highlighted with factor values of -2.35 (construction) and 0.04 (C&I). 
 
The two curves in the center panel convert these two factors into charge-off rates. 
There are of course twelve such curves within BankCaR, and all are calibrated to 
the data. The illustrative draw of the construction factor produces the sizable 
construction charge-off rate of 6.6%. The near-zero draw of the C&I factor 
produces a middling C&I charge-off rate of 1.2%. This pair of simulated charge-
off rates is highlighted in the panel at the right.  
 
The panel at the right shows the 1,000 scenarios that correspond to points in the 
panel at the left. According to the right panel, there will many years with near-
zero construction charge-off rates and a few years with highly elevated rates; the 
charge-off rates for C&I are not forecast at either extreme. These stylized facts 
reflect the general patterns apparent in the historical rates shown in Figure 2.  
 
Normally, the mean of each simulated factor is equal to zero, and the mean of 
each simulated charge-off rate is equal to the average historical charge-off rate. If 
the next year's charge-off rate is expected to differ from the historical average, a 
fixed amount can be added to draws of the associated factor. This adjustment 
allows for nontrivial forecasting while maintaining other aspects of the statistical 
distribution.  
 
When new data become available, the statistical parameters are recalibrated and 
new scenarios are generated. The same set of scenarios is used for all analyses 
performed in a year. Using the same scenarios for different banks removes a 
source of randomness that would otherwise affect comparisons between banks.  
 
BankCaR produces several measures and indicators of risk: a bank's Capital-at-
Risk (CaR), its characteristic scenario, its risk type, and its stressed capital.  
 
CaR is defined as the 99.5th percentile of a bank's loss. Operationally, this equals 
the 500th worst among the 100,000 possible losses, stated as a percent of the 
bank's total assets. CaR is the credit portfolio equivalent of Value-at-Risk, 
commonly used to the measure the risk of portfolios of traded financial 
instruments.  
 
A bank's characteristic scenario portrays the average conditions under which loss 
equals CaR. Conceptually, the characteristic scenario is the mathematically 
expected scenario that produces loss equal to CaR. Operationally, BankCaR takes 
the average among a subset of its scenarios. Scenario losses are sorted and 
averages taken of the greatest two losses, the greatest three, and so forth. One of 
these averages is closest to CaR. The average of the associated scenarios is the 
characteristic scenario. In practice the characteristic scenario is the average of 1-
2% of all scenarios. Thus, the characteristic scenario produces loss equal to CaR 
and serves as a portrayal of the average scenario that produces loss at that level.  
 
  - 7 -Taken together, CaR and the characteristic scenario provide a summary of the 
bank's loss distribution. An even simpler summary is provided by CaR and risk 
type. A bank's risk type is the category that contributes the bank's greatest 
charge-off when the characteristic scenario is active. A given bank's risk type is 
not the whole story since two or more categories might contribute nearly equally 
to loss, but risk type can nonetheless be a useful summary. 
 
BankCaR compares a bank's CaR to its financial resources. Specifically, stressed 
capital is defined as equal to tier 1 capital plus allowances for loan and lease 
losses (ALLL) less CaR.2 Presumably, a bank having greater stressed capital 
would be better able to survive a year of high credit loss.  Finally, BankCaR 
assigns a degree of inherent credit risk (High, Above Average, Average, or Low) 
based on the bank's stressed capital compared to other banks.  
 
 
Assumptions and limitations 
  
Like all statistical models, BankCaR makes numerous assumptions. The most 
important assumption is that every bank is vulnerable to the system-wide charge-
off scenario, irrespective of the bank's location, size, or other characteristics. 
Although this assumption excludes some sources of bank risk, it facilitates a 
direct comparison between different institutions. Naturally, nothing reported by 
BankCaR can supplant detailed knowledge of an institution, its history, and its 
competitive environment.  
 
Some assumptions follow from the nature of call report data. Call report category 
data are not distinguished by risk; therefore, BankCaR assumes that all loans 
within a category are uniform in obligor quality, outstanding amount, and 
potential for recovery. Call reports reflect only category-level outstanding loan 
balances. BankCaR does not model gains or losses from investment accounts or 
from contingent exposures such as loan commitments and off-balance sheet 
derivatives. Call reports do not contain estimates of the marked-to-market values 
of loan portfolios; BankCaR is calibrated only to amounts actually charged off.  
 
Parameter values are assumed to be constant over time, as would be the case if 
underwriting standards were unchanged. In calibrating parameters, two choices 
are believed to have minor effects. The gross charge-off rate is used, in part 
because net charge-offs can be negative for technical reasons. The annual time 
step is used, in part because unobserved category factors are autocorrelated at the 
quarterly time step.  
 
BankCaR does not quantify many variables that are important to overall bank 
risk, such as liquidity, control structures, technical and managerial quality, off-
balance sheet exposures, hedging activities, and so forth. In particular, BankCaR 
                                                 
2 Not all of ALLL might be available to absorb charge-offs, because some provisions in ALLL are 
associated with specific loans that might not default. The distinction between specific provisions 
(FAS-5) and general provisions (FAS-114) cannot be observed in call report data. 
  - 8 -is not a capital model. Banks hold capital to cover not only credit losses but also 
to cover market losses, operational losses, and other losses. BankCaR is not 






This section describes the technical details of BankCaR's probability model. The 
bulk of the section describes the marginal distribution of the charge-off rate 
within a category. Once the marginal distributions are in place, they are readily 
connected to each other. 
 
The underlying model is the structural credit portfolio model based on the 
insights of Robert Merton. The model produces the probability distribution of 
loss, relative to the return of par, resulting from default. It is commonly used to 
measure portfolio credit risk at banks. Recently, the model gained prominence as 
the basis for the Basel II minimum capital requirement.  
 
Merton's model produces the distribution of the default rate. In addition, loss 
depends on the distribution of dollar exposure amounts and on the distribution 
of loss given default (LGD), which is the fraction of par that is lost on a defaulted 
instrument. BankCaR assumes that loan amounts are small enough that no single 
loan can have an appreciable effect on a charge-off rate. The role of LGD is 
developed later.  
 
We begin with a particular loan made to a firm. The model assumes that when 
the loan matures there is a comparison between the firm's assets and liabilities. 
In the case of a surplus, the firm can refinance or find other ways to make 
payment. In the case of a shortfall, the firm defaults.  
 
The model assumes that the value of the firm's liabilities is known and that the 
return on the firm's assets has a normal distribution. Standardizing the asset 
return has no effect on the idea that default occurs if and only if asset return is 
less than some fixed threshold. Symbolizing the standardized asset return as αi: 
 
(1) Firm  i defaults if and only if  ] 1 , 0 [ ~ where *, N i i i α α α <  
 
The probability that Firm i defaults is designated PDi. Therefore, PDi = Φ(αi*), 
where Φ(·) represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function 
(CDF). Using the inverse CDF, αi* = Φ-1(PDi). In practice, PD refers to a fixed 
interval of time. In BankCaR, the period is one year, which is equal to the forecast 
horizon.  
 
The asset returns of firms in the same category are assumed to be jointly normal. 
As such, they can be represented by a factor model. BankCaR assumes that there 
  - 9 -is a single systematic factor affecting the asset returns of all firms in the 
category.3 Each firm's asset return is also affected by an independent 
idiosyncratic factor that is normally distributed. When the systematic and 
idiosyncratic factors are standardized, a single parameter, ρi, decomposes αi into 
sources of risk: 
 
(2)  ] 1 , 0 [ . . . ~ , ; 1 N d i i X Z X Z i i i i i ρ ρ α − + =  
 
Z is the average standardized asset return of firms in the category and is referred 
to as the category factor. If Z takes a positive value, asset returns tend to be above 
average. Because Xi is independent of other information, there is no opportunity 
for Firm i to be affected by other firms that might share its industry, region, or 
other characteristic. 
 
BankCaR assumes that all firms in the category are statistically identical. Thus, 
the parameters PD and ρ are uniform within the category. This implies that the 
correlation between the asset returns of two firms in a category is equal to ρ: 
 
(3)  ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ α α = − + − + = ] 1 , 1 [ ] , [ h i h i X Z X Z Corr Corr  
Because of this, the parameter ρ in structural models is often referred to as "asset 
return correlation," and estimates of correlation based on asset returns are often 
employed in credit models. This puts great faith in the validity of the model's 
stylized assumptions. By contrast, BankCaR calibrates all parameters, including 
its correlations, to call report data. To reinforce this distinction, we refer to 
parameter ρ as "category correlation." Other things equal, a category with greater 
correlation would exhibit greater dispersion of the default rate. 
 
The centerpiece of the model is the conditional probability that Firm i defaults. 
Supposing that the systematic factor Z takes the value z, the default of Firm i 
depends completely on the realization of its idiosyncratic factor Xi. This insight 
leads to an expression for the conditionally expected default rate that was first 
provided by Oldrich Vasicek: 
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Expression (4) states the conditionally expected default rate for a firm. In an 
asymptotic portfolio, it is also the default rate for the category. If z is greater than 
zero the default rate is less than PD, while if z is somewhat less than zero the 
default rate is greater than PD.  
                                                 
3 In the terminology introduced by Michael Gordy, within a category BankCaR is an asymptotic 
single risk factor model.  
  - 10 - 
Allowing the subscript to distinguish categories and λ to represent the default 
rate, λj is an invertible function of the category factor:  
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Figures 4 and 5 illustrate these functions for cases of high correlation (PD = 
0.75%, ρ = 22.2%) and low correlation (PD = 0.74%, ρ = 2.9%).4 Figure 4 shows 
that the two distributions are equally likely to produce default rates greater than 
about 1.0%. Figure 5 shows that the high-correlation distribution is much more 
likely to produce high rates of default. It should be apparent that this family of 
distributions can produce a large range of shapes, including highly skewed 
distributions. 
 
To complete the specification of the probability model, BankCaR assumes that 
the standard normal category factors are jointly normal. Any pair of category 
                                                 
4 These values reflect the estimates for construction and for lease financing, respectively.  
  - 11 -factors is therefore connected by a factor correlation. Symbolizing the 12x12 
matrix of factor correlations, Σ = [[ρij]], the joint PDF of the twelve default rates 
is given by change-of-variable: 
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where φ12(·, Σ) is the twelve-variable standard normal PDF with correlation 
matrix equal to Σ. The resulting connection between the marginal charge-off rate 





This section describes how BankCaR's parameters are calibrated to values that 
best reflect historical charge-off rates, according to the principle of maximum 
likelihood. The current values of the parameters appear in Table 2.  
 
Four issues arise when calibration takes place. The first issue is that the theory 
presented in the previous section derives a distribution of the default rate. A 
default rate would be generally greater than a charge-off rate, because a bank 
does not lose 100% of the balance of every loan in every case. Call reports do not 
contain separate default rates and LGD rates. Lacking the data, BankCaR makes 
an identifying assumption to bridge the gap.  
 
A naïve identifying assumption would be to assume that in any year the LGD rate 
equals the same fixed value. If this were 25%, a sequence of charge-off rates 
{CR1, CR2, …, CRT} would imply a sequence of default rates {CR1/0.25, 
CR2/0.25, …, CRT/0.25}. The distribution of the default rate would be calibrated 
to these data, and the loss rate would equal one-quarter the default rate. 
 
The naïve approach assumes that LGD does not vary with conditions, but the 
opposite has become widely accepted. The Basel II capital requirement, for 
example, recognizes that LGD can be greater in downturn conditions than in 
average conditions. If LGD rises at the same time as the default rate, there is 
more risk than if only the default rate rises in a downturn. For this reason, the 
naïve approach understates risk.  
 
Instead of the naïve approach, BankCaR assumes that the risk of a loan depends 
on its expected loss and not on the decomposition of expected loss into PD and 
expected LGD. In particular, BankCaR assumes that risk would be unaffected if 
the unknown value of expected LGD were equal to 100%. This allows BankCaR to 
apply the theory of the default rate directly to the data on charge-off rates. 
Though for calibration purposes BankCaR assumes that LGD = 100%, there is no 
inference regarding the values of expected LGD and PD, which remain unknown. 
Implicitly, the annual average LGD varies in step with the default rate. 
  - 12 - 
The second issue involves the maximization of the likelihood function. Many 
likelihood functions must be maximized in all parameters simultaneously; 
however, a two-stage approach finds the same results given the nature of the 
BankCaR likelihood function. In the first stage, BankCaR analyzes each of the 
twelve categories in turn. In a category j, the observed charge-off rate in year t is 
CRj,t, and its unconditional expectation is ECRj. BankCaR assumes 
independence between years and maximizes the likelihood function derived from 
Expression (7): 
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This provides maximum likelihood estimates of ECRj and ρj. These in turn imply 
estimates of zj,t according to Expression (6). In the second stage, all twelve 
sequences { } are in hand, and correlations between them can be 
calculated as usual to produce maximum likelihood estimates of the factor 
correlations.  
t t t z z z , 12 , 2 , 1 ˆ ,..., ˆ , ˆ
 
This two-stage approach produces exactly the same result as maximizing the joint 
likelihood function simultaneously in all ninety parameters. In the first stage, the 
parameters of categories are distinct. The parameters ECR1 and ρ1 do not appear 
in the marginal distributions of CR2, CR3, …, or CR12. Therefore, those data tell 
nothing about the values of ECR1 and ρ1; the maximum likelihood estimates of 
ECR1 and ρ1 are the same whether they are obtained from the marginal 
likelihoods or from the joint likelihood. Since the same is true of every category, 
working category-by-category provides the same estimates of ECR and ρ as 
would be found using simultaneous estimation. 
 
In the second state, when the category-by-category estimates of ECRj, and ρj are 
substituted into Expression (8), the only remaining unknowns appear in the 
correlation matrix Σ: 
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The maximum value of Expression (10) would therefore occur at the maximum 
likelihood estimates of the correlations between the set of inferred category 
factors  . These are exactly the correlations 
that BankCaR produces in the second stage of the calibration.  
)} ( ˆ , ... ), ( ˆ ), ( ˆ { , 12 12 , 2 2 , 1 1 t t t CR z CR z CR z
 
Thus, the special nature of BankCaR's likelihood function—the lockstep relation 
between CR's and Z's, mediated by distinct PD's and ρ's—allows a two-step 
  - 13 -procedure to produce the same estimates as would be found using simultaneous 
estimation. In practice, the two-step procedure is superior because 
multidimensional routines can converge to points along constraints rather than 
to the interior global maximum found using the two-stage approach. 
 
The third issue is that BankCaR departs from a common credit modeling practice 
that takes literally the role of asset correlation. In that practice, estimates of 
correlation based on asset return data are substituted into the credit risk model. 
The distributions that result only partly reflect credit loss data. In part, they also 
reflect the data used to calibrate asset return correlation. By contrast, the 
parameters of BankCaR reflect only the historical charge-off rates that have 
actually been experienced. 
  
The fourth issue is that the charge-off series for the six real estate categories are 
not available prior to 1991. To handle this missing data, BankCaR employs a 
maximum likelihood technique provided by Donald Morrison. To improve the 
statistical fit in the 1984-1990 sub-period, BankCaR employs a 13x13 matrix of 
factor correlations that includes a factor for total real estate, for which charge-off 
rates are available for all years. Once the factor correlation estimates are in hand, 
no further use is made of the total real estate series.  
 
Table 2. BankCaR parameter estimates and conditionally expected charge-off rates
Category ECR j ρ j CCR j Factor correlations, ρ ij
C&I  1.44% 4.2% 4.5% -32% 46% 60% 83% 66% 59% 57% 29% 56% -10% 84%
Consumer 2.68% 2.3% 6.0% -32% -16% -45% -8% -76% -57% -61% -21% -3% 1% -63%
Other Lending 1.23% 12.6% 7.7% 46% -16% 79% 32% 6% 60% 51% 72% 66% -6% 25%
Depository Institutions 0.62% 26.8% 8.7% 60% -45% 79% 39% 48% 65% 63% 58% 51% -19% 45%
Lease Financing 0.74% 2.9% 2.1% 83% -8% 32% 39% 44% 34% 32% 9% 35% -40% 60%
Agriculture 1.00% 10.8% 5.9% 66% -76% 6% 48% 44% 50% 56% 6% 11% -20% 79%
Construction 0.75% 22.2% 8.3% 59% -57% 60% 65% 34% 50% 99% 85% 80% 13% 70%
Non-farm non-residential 0.40% 10.6% 2.7% 57% -61% 51% 63% 32% 56% 99% 81% 76% 10% 72%
Multifamily 0.37% 15.5% 3.5% 29% -21% 72% 58% 9% 6% 85% 81% 88% 17% 28%
Farm 0.14% 2.3% 0.4% 56% -3% 66% 51% 35% 11% 80% 76% 88% 23% 47%
1-4 Revolving 0.20% 0.7% 0.4% -10% 1% -6% -19% -40% -20% 13% 10% 17% 23% 10%








































Table 2 shows the BankCaR parameter estimates for 2007, using data through 
year-end 2006. Table 2 also shows the conditional charge-off rate (CCRj) for 
each category. The CCR of a category is defined as the 99.5th percentile of the 





























Among the factor correlations appearing in Table 2, most are positive, consistent 
with the commonplace observation that the economic cycle tends to affect most 
firms irrespective of category. The four commercial real estate factors are 
especially strongly related.  
 
  - 14 -As we have seen, the identifying LGD assumption made by BankCaR infers 
greater risk than the naïve approach assuming a fixed value of LGD. The 
quantitative difference is not always great. Using the naïve approach with LGD 
assumed equal to 30%, the difference is less than 10% of CCR for ten of the 
twelve categories, and it is less than 20% of CCR in the remaining two categories. 
Thus, the effect of LGD variation in BankCaR is not extreme.  
 
Confidence regions can be derived from the asymptotic likelihood ratio, which 
approaches the χ2 distribution as the number of years rises. Taking separately 
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Figure 6. Parameter estimates, 95% confidence regions, and 













































Figure 6 shows the maximum likelihood estimates of ECRj and ρj and the 95% 
confidence regions derived from Expression (12). For the three categories 
appearing at the lower left (farm loans, one-to-four-family revolving residential 
mortgages, and one-to-four-family other residential mortgages) the confidence 
regions are small. For some other categories, the category-level data cannot reject 
a large range of combinations of ECR and ρ.  
 
The parameter uncertainty implies uncertainty regarding conditional charge-off 
rates. Figure 6 illustrates this with level curves of CCR equal to 1%, 5%, 10%, 
20%, 30%, and 40%. A separate indication is provided by bootstrapping. For 
three categories, we resample the charge-off data, re-estimate the parameters, 
and recalculate CCR 1,000 times. The bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for 
CCR are 3.3% to 5.3% for C&I, 4.6% to 7.1% for consumer, and 1.4% to 18.5% for 
construction. The significant uncertainty in tail estimates is principally a 
consequence of the available data: we seek the worst charge-off that would come 
about once in 200 years, yet we have only sixteen years of construction charge-off 
  - 15 -data to work with. Especially given the pattern of the rates in certain categories, 
there is great uncertainty in projections of tail risk.  
 
 
The US composite bank 
 
This section shows some of the results that are available when BankCaR is 
applied to a bank. The bank in the spotlight is the US composite bank—a 
hypothetical bank representing the US banking sector as a whole. The loan 
amounts of the composite bank equal to the sums of loans at all commercial 
banks.  
 
Table 3. Composite bank loss in an illustrative scenario
$Billions    Illustrative scenario          
Lending Category   Outstanding  Charge-off rate $B Charge-off   
C&I 970 1.25% 12.1
Consumer 752 1.47% 11.0
Other Lending 176 1.33% 2.3
Depository Institutions 106 0.21% 0.2
Lease Financing 124 0.36% 0.4
Agriculture 54 0.71% 0.4
Construction 497 6.63% 33.0
Non-farm non-residential 808 2.11% 17.0
Multifamily 106 2.51% 2.7
Farm 52 0.28% 0.1
1-4 Revolving Residential 467 0.32% 1.5
1-4 Other Residential 1,430 0.21% 2.9
Non-Loan Assets 4,497 --- --- 
Totals 10,038 83.8
Composite bank loss in the illustrative charge-off scenario 0.83%  
 
Table 3 displays the composite bank loan balances as of year-end 2006. Table 3 
also shows an illustrative scenario that is an extension of an earlier example. The 
dollar charge-off in any category is the product of the loan balance and the 
charge-off rate. No charge-off results from assets other than loans. Combining 
charge-offs from all categories, the illustrative scenario produces a loss equal to 
0.83% of assets. This would illustrate one of the 100,000 simulation runs that 
build up the distribution of a bank's loss distribution. 
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The distribution of loss for the composite bank is shown in Figure 7. Loss is 
highly concentrated in a narrow range: over 49% of scenarios produce loss in the 
range 0.40%-0.60% of assets. Because of this concentration, the vertical axis 
Figure 7 is shown on a logarithmic scale. Only one scenario in twenty produces 
loss greater than 0.80%. CaR is equal to the 500th greatest loss, 1.32%.  
 
For each scenario, BankCaR determines the category that contributes the greatest 
amount of loss. Except in 0.04% of scenarios, the dominant category is consumer 
(71.8%), C&I (25.6%), or construction (2.6%). This breakdown parallels the 
breakdown of twenty-three years of historical data: consumer has been the 
greatest contributor in fifteen years, C&I in eight years, and construction in none 
of the years.  
 
The breakdown is different, though, depending on the overall amount of loss. As 
shown in Figure 7, if overall loss is low or moderate, the consumer category or the 
C&I category is likely to produce the greatest loss. If overall loss is greater than 
about 1.20% the construction category becomes dominant. Thus, if the US 
banking system has a year of very high charge-offs overall, BankCaR projects that 
primary source of charge-offs will differ from what has been observed 
historically. An adverse year is likely to be dominated by construction charge-offs 
and more generally by the broader grouping of commercial real estate. 
 
The average of the 1,377 scenarios producing greatest loss is the characteristic 
scenario for the composite bank. Not surprisingly, it projects a high rate of 
charge-off in the construction category.  
 
  - 17 -Figure 8. The characteristic scenario for the composite bank
(charge-off rate in parentheses next to category name)
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Loss in characteristic scenario
 
 
Figure 8 compares loan balances to loss amounts under the characteristic 
scenario of the composite bank. The characteristic scenario itself appears in 
parentheses next to the category names.  
 
Though exposure to construction loans is only 9% of total loans, construction 
contributes more loss than any other category under the characteristic scenario. 
The composite bank is therefore said to have the construction risk type. C&I is a 
close second. 
 
The composite bank enjoys a diversification benefit because the twelve category 
factors are correlated imperfectly. If instead we assume instead that all factors 
correlations equal 100%, every factor would attain its 99.5th percentile in the 
same scenario, and CaR would depend only on category CCRs. For the composite 
bank, the loss would then equal 1.91%. The full-model value of CaR, 1.32%, 
therefore represents a diversification benefit equal to 30.8%. 
 
 
Individual US Banks  
 
This section repeats the foregoing analysis for each of the 7264 commercial banks 
observed by BankCaR at year-end 2006. On average, the diversification benefit is 
20.6%. This is naturally less than for the better-diversified composite bank. 
Among the individual banks, the diversification benefit ranges between 0% and 
45%. Banks that specialize in a single category have the least diversification 
benefit. The greatest diversification benefit is enjoyed by banks having the 
consumer risk type because of the negative correlation between the consumer 
factor and other factors.  
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Depository Institutions 17 1.18%
Lease Financing 5 1.45%
Agriculture 1,039 1.72%
Construction 4,921 2.01%
Non-farm non-residential 287 1.52%
Multifamily Residential 9 1.59%
Farm 1 1.39%
1-4 Family Revolving 1 0.12%
1-4 Family Other 158 1.33%
All Banks 7,264 1.87%  
 
Table 4 shows the distribution of banks by risk type and the associated average 
value of CaR. Three of the risk types contain 9o% of banks: C&I, agriculture, and 
construction. Some other risk types are poorly represented either because few 
banks have substantial exposure to the category (for example, lease financing), or 
because the CCR of the category is low (for example, farm lending).  
 
Construction, which has been shown to have outsized effects on the composite 
bank, also plays an important role at the individual bank level. Over 2/3 of banks 
have the construction risk type, and banks having the construction risk type have 
the greatest average value of CaR. An detailed  analysis of the source of risk is 
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As a screening tool that compares credit risk between banks, BankCaR highlights 
banks that have low levels of stressed capital. Specifically, the banks having the 
lowest 5% of stressed capital are designated "High Risk", the next 20% are 
designated "Above Normal Risk", the center 50% are designated "Normal Risk", and the 25% with greatest Stressed Capital are designated "Low Risk". These 
designations are somewhat arbitrary in that bank risk is a continuous spectrum 
without definite break points, and yet a level of stressed capital at the risky end of 
the spectrum should not be ignored by bank managers or examiners. The current 
break points between designations are illustrated in Figure 9. 
 





























The break points are remarkably stable over time, as shown in Figure 10. This 
results from offsetting influences. The corresponding percentiles of CaR have 
risen over time, as shown in Figure 11. The general rise in CaR has been offset by 
a simultaneous rise in bank holdings of Tier 1 capital plus ALLL, producing 
stability in the distribution of stressed capital.  
 
Figure 11 also shows that the inter-quartile range of CaR has increased over time. 
Credit risk at different banks differs more than it did previously. This trend 












































Neither (61%) 2007-01 only (34%)
Both (4%) BankCaR only (1%)
 
BankCaR's High Risk banks can be compared to the set of banks highlighted by 
an exposure-based screen. In Figure 12, each dot represents a US commercial 
  - 20 -bank. BankCaR would highlight banks lower in the diagram, that is, banks with 
relatively low values of stressed capital. To make this definite, the diagram 
isolates the 5% of banks that BankCaR designates as High Risk.  
 
By contrast, an example of an exposure-based screen is Federal Reserve SR Letter 
2007-01. This SR Letter highlights banks that have a high ratio of either CRE or 
construction lending to total capital.5 This is a not unreasonable screening 
criterion, given that construction loans have statistically high risk as confirmed 
by the analysis of BankCaR. And yet, since it is based on exposure rather than on 
risk, it calls attention to banks having high levels of stressed capital. Those banks, 
recall, would have substantial levels of tier 1 plus ALLL even if they were to 
experience charge-off at the high level represented by CaR. An exposure-based 
criterion is also likely to miss some banks that have low levels of stressed capital, 
simply because those banks do not have the exposure that is being screened for.  
 
A separate target of analysis is the set of BankCaR's scenarios. A particular 
scenario might cause a well capitalized bank to become adequately capitalized, 
undercapitalized, significantly undercapitalized, or critically undercapitalized.6 
Many BankCaR scenarios produce no change in the status of any bank, because 
they involve low and moderate rates of charge-off. Some scenarios produce a few 
















Figure 13. Number of undercapitalized banks in the worst scenarios, 












































Figure 13 portrays scenarios that cause a well capitalized bank to become 
undercapitalized. Only 1,000 scenarios are shown, sorted by the number of banks 
affected. The worst scenario causes about 2,500 banks to become 
undercapitalized. Of these, about 1,800 would have greater charge-offs in 
construction than in any other category; the remaining 700 would have their 
greatest charge-offs in a category other than construction. All told, Figure 13 
                                                 
5 SR 2007-01 also considers growth in the CRE portfolio and excludes lending on owner-occupied 
buildings. These conditions are not reflected in this comparison because of data limitations.  
6 These terms are defined in the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, which places banks within 
categories defined in part by the ratio between capital and assets. 
  - 21 -portrays 539,920 events in which a bank becomes undercapitalized. In 80% of 
those events, construction is the greatest source of loss. 
 
The construction category has been encountered repeatedly in these analyses. 
When the composite bank has an unusually great loss, the category making the 
greatest contribution tends to be construction. Among individual banks, most 
have the construction risk type. Banks having the construction risk type tend to 
have a high level of CaR. In an adverse event, such as one of the scenarios 
portrayed in Figure 13, banks that become undercapitalized are likely to find that 
construction loans produce greater charge-offs than any other category. Despite 
all this, a bank's exposure to the construction category is not the whole story 





BankCaR forecasts the distribution of a commercial bank's charge-offs at the 
horizon of one year. This departs from traditional styles of forecasting that 
produce point estimates. One traditional style focuses on the asset quality of a 
bank's loans using tools such as regulatory classifications, the level and trend of 
loans past due, and other factors. Another style focuses on macroeconomic or 
financial variables such as output, interest rates, equity returns, or other data. 
Forecasts, for the bank or for the macro economy, are most accurate when the 
forecast horizon is short. To the extent that such forecasts are valid for a longer 
horizon, they could be incorporated into later versions of BankCaR. 
 
Applied to the composite US commercial bank, BankCaR finds that the 99.5th 
percentile of the distribution of charge-offs is equal to the moderate value of 
1.32%. If the US aggregate charge-off were this high, BankCaR predicts that 
construction lending would probably contribute more charge-offs than any other 
category. By contrast, the greatest contributor has historically been consumer or 
C&I lending. BankCaR predicts that a bad year would be dominated, for the first 
time, by construction.  
 
Applied separately to each US bank, BankCaR efficiently identifies banks that 
have an adverse combination of credit risk and financial risk resources, defined 
as tier 1 capital plus ALLL. The difference, stressed capital, is a natural metric for 
comparing the inherent credit risk of banks. Over the last seven years, the 
distribution of stressed capital has been stable as a result of offsetting increases 
in risk and capital.  
 
BankCaR uses publicly available regulatory reporting data, the most common 
credit portfolio model, and standard quantitative techniques. These generic 
qualities provide a standard of comparison between banks and a benchmark for 
more detailed models developed for specific banking institutions. 
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